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Federal Insurance Co. v. Coast Converters, Inc., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 95 (Dec. 24, 2014)1 
 
CONTRACTS – INSURANCE POLICY INTERPRETATION AND POLICY LIMIT 
APPLICATION  
 
Summary 
 
 In a dispute between an insured manufacturer and its insurer, the Supreme Court 
determined that contract interpretation is a question of law, which should be decided by 
the district court. Further, to determine which policy limit applies, the court must 
determine on what date the loss became manifest. The manifestation date is generally a 
question of fact to be decided by the jury, which the district court will apply and 
determine, as a matter of law, which policy limit applies.  
 
Background 
 
 Respondent Coast Converters, Inc. (hereinafter “Coast”) manufactured plastic 
bags in California. Coast moved its operation to Las Vegas in 2003. In June 2003, Coast 
obtained a commercial package all-risk insurance policy from appellant Federal 
Insurance Company (hereinafter “Federal Insurance”). The policy covered up to $2 
million in property damage (hereinafter “PD”), and up to $1.75 million for business 
interruption/extra expenses (hereinafter “BI/EE”). On August 27, 2003, Coast requested 
and received an increase in the PD coverage from $2 million to $5 million.  
 Prior to moving the operation to Las Vegas, electrical modifications were made to 
the Las Vegas facility. The modifications were inadequate and caused voltage 
fluctuations. These fluctuations damaged machinery used in the manufacturing process 
and caused an increase in the amount of defective bags, or  “scrap”.  
 Coast filed a claim with Federal Insurance to recover the costs related to the 
damaged machinery and the increased production of “scrap”. Coast asserted that it was 
unable to separate the defective bags from the quality ones, rendering the entire package 
of bags a total loss.  
 Federal Insurance made several payments to Coast, though did not communicate 
under which provision, PD or BI/EE, the payments were made. Federal Insurance later 
allocated a small portion of the payments related to the damaged machinery to the PD 
coverage. The majority of the payments were made under the BI/EE coverage. Federal 
Insurance ultimately made payments covering the increased scrap and other losses up to 
the entire $1.75 million BI/EE policy limit.  
 Coast argued the scrap losses should have been covered under the PD provision, 
Federal Insurance disagreed and refused to make any additional payments. Coast alleged 
it ultimately went out of business as a result of Federal Insurance’s refusal to pay. Coast 
filed a complaint against Federal Insurance.  
 Federal Insurance asked the district court to determine (1) whether Coast’s loss 
fell under the policy’s PD provision of the BI/EE provision; and (2) if PD coverage was 
appropriate, whether the coverage limit was $2 million or $5 million. The district court 
declined to answer these questions and left them for the jury to decide. The jury found 
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Federal Insurance liable in the amount of $4,005,866 for breaching the insurance contract 
and in the amount of $5,048,717 for violating the Nevada Unfair Claims Practices Act 
(UCPA).2 The district court did not offset the judgment by the amount already paid on the 
increased scrap insurance claim, and awarded Coast attorney fees and prejudgment 
interest.  
 Federal Insurance appealed, arguing that (1) the district court erred in refusing to 
rule, as a matter of law, on the policy coverage and policy limit issues, as well as on the 
UCPA claims; (2) substantial evidence did not support the jury’s findings on the breach 
of contract and UCPA claims; (3) the jury erred in finding it liable under the UCPA; (4) 
the district court erred in refusing to offset the judgment by the amount already paid on 
the claim; and (5) the district court erred in granting attorney fees as special damages.  
  
Discussion 
 
Interpretation of the insurance policy 
 
 In contract matters, the jury may be charged with deciding any factual disputes.3 
But “‘in the absence of ambiguity or other factual complexities,’ contract interpretation 
presents a question of law” for the district court to decide, “with de novo review to follow 
in this court.”4 
 The Supreme Court found that deciding whether the PD or BI/EE provision 
applies, is a question of contract interpretation, and thus, a question of law. As a question 
of law, the district court erred in sending this question to the jury.  
 A determination of which provision covers Coast’s loss hinges on a question of 
fact for the jury to decide. The jury must determine on what date Coast became aware 
that continued use of its machines would result in the production of an increased amount 
of scrap? Once the jury determines when awareness occurred, the district court must then 
apply that fact and conclude, as a matter of law, that increased “scrap” produced after that 
date is covered under the BI/EE provision. 
 The Supreme Court concluded that increased “scrap” produced before awareness 
is covered by the PD provision, and increased “scrap” produced after awareness is 
covered by the BI/EE provision. The BI/EE provision applies to the “scrap” produced 
after awareness because it fits the policy definition of an extra expense, and the scrap 
cannot be categorized as property under the implied requirement of fortuity.  
Insurable loss of or damage to property must be occasioned by a fortuitous, 
noninevitable, and nonintentional event. 5  A loss occasioned by the insured’s own 
decision to act in a way that will predictably result in a loss is not fortuitous; and thus, 
such a loss is generally not covered.6 Therefore, if Coast was aware that continued use of 
their machines would produce a higher amount of scrap, such a loss would not be covered 
by the PD provision.   
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Determining which PD policy limit applies was a question of law for the district court to 
decide 
 
 Coast received an increase in the PD policy limit on August 27, 2003. The court 
must determine whether the applicable policy limit is the original $2 million, or the 
amended $5 million. Determining which PD policy limit applies is a question of law.  
In Nevada, to determine whether an insurance policy applies to ongoing property 
damage the “manifestation rule” must be used. 7  Under the “manifestation rule,” an 
insurer is only liable under the policy if it was in effect when the loss became manifest.8 
A loss becomes manifest when appreciable damage occurs and is or should be known to 
the insured, such that a reasonable insured would be aware that his notification duty 
under the policy has been triggered.9 Generally, the manifestation date is a fact to be 
determined by the jury, but a court may decide the date where the undisputed evidence 
establishes that no damage had been discovered before a given date.10 To determine the 
applicable policy limit, the jury must decide when manifestation occurred, and the district 
court must then apply that fact and determine which policy limit applies. 
 
Coast's UCPA claim is dependent on a proper interpretation of the contract  
 
 Coast’s UCPA claim depends on the district court’s determination of how the 
excess scrap should be categorized under the policy pending the jury’s finding of when 
Coast became aware that continued production would lead to an increase in “scrap”. As 
such, the jury’s verdict regard Federal Insurance’s liability under the UCPA is vacated, 
and the issue is remanded for a new trial.    
    
Conclusion 
 
 Contract interpretation and determination of which policy limit applies are 
questions of law for the district court to decide. The district court erred in submitting 
these questions to the jury. The Supreme Court determined that under a proper 
interpretation of the policy, losses incurred after Coast became aware that increased scrap 
would be produced, are covered under the BI/EE provision. The losses incurred before 
Coast became aware are covered under the PD provision and should be valued as 
“finished stock.”  
To determine the applicable PD policy limit, the jury must use the manifest rule to 
determine what date the loss became manifest. The district court must then apply that fact 
and determine which policy limit applies. The court found that because the jury’s verdict 
on Coast’s UCPA claim was influenced by an improper interpretation of the contract, the 
verdict must be vacated. Therefore, the court vacated in part, and reversed and remanded 
for further proceedings.  
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